The Democratic Dilemma : Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

￥3,500 （送料：￥270）

• 著者 Lupia, Arthur/ McCubbins, Mathew D.
• 出版社 Cambridge University Press
• 刊行年 1998
• ページ数 300ｐ
• サイズ 23ｃｍ
• 状態 中古品（良好）
• 解説 目次
  List of Tables and Figures
  Series Editors' Preface
  Acknowledgments
  1 Knowledge and the Foundation of Democracy
  Democracy, Delegation, and Reasoned Choice orgies
  A Preview of Our Theory
  Plan of the Book
  2 How People Learn
  
  PART I: THEORY A
  Attention! This Is How We Learn
  The Cognitive Stock Market
  Attention and Connections
  Conclusion
  3 How People Learn from Others
  The Aristotelian Theories of Persuasion
  Our Theory of Persuasion
  Dynamic Implications
  Persuasive Implications
  Conclusion
  4 What People Learn from Others
  The Conditions for Enlightenment
  The Conditions for Deception
  Discussion: How We Choose Whom to Believe
  Conclusion
  Pers
  5 Delegation and Democracy
  The Dilemma of Delegation
  A Theory of Delegation with Communication
  What It All Means
  Conclusion
  PART II: EXPERIMENTS
  6 Theory, Predictions, and the Scientific Method
  7 Laboratory Experiments on Information,
  Persuasion, and Choice
  Experimental Design
  その他
  言語 ENG